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Abstract
Since 1971, China, Taiwan and Japan have been claiming sovereignty on Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. These islands have been the subject matters
of  dispute due to the existence of  oil deposits underneath and also being strategic
location for exploitation of  oil and gas resources in the region. China claims historic
title over the Diaoyu Islands, as these have been inherent part of  it since ancient
times. It further contends that islands were seized by Japan during the 1895 Sino-
Japan War. On the other hand, Japan concedes that it had occupied the Senkaku
Islands since 1895 while these islands were terra nullius and totally uninhibited prior
to that time. Besides, China had never challenged Japanese exercise of  sovereignty
over these islands until 1971 in which the United Nations reported to have substantial
oil and gas reserves in the area. As far as contemporary international adjudication is
concerned, a state has immense prospect of  having title over the territory if  it can
prove the exercise of  state sovereignty and ‘effective control’ (effectivités) over the
disputed territory. This is because international courts and tribunals, in practice,
predominantly draw attention solely on the element of  effective control in deciding
the territorial and boundary disputes in spite of  having various modes and concepts
of  acquisition of  territory under international law. Accordingly, this paper analyses
critically the judicial interpretation and application of  the principle of  ‘effectivités’ by
the international courts and tribunals in resolving inter-state territorial and boundary
disputes. Additionally, it applies the principle to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute,
and finally offers some amicable solutions to address the dispute among the parties
in peaceful manners under the purview of  international law.
I INTRODUCTION
Since 1971, China, Taiwan and Japan have disputed over claiming sovereignty to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. These islands have been the subject
matters of  dispute mainly due to the existence of  oil and gas deposits underneath and
around. This archipilago consists of  five uninhabited islands and three barren rocks
with approximate total surface area of  6.3 km² situated in the East China Sea.1 These
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1 Steven Wei Su, “The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update,” 36Ocean
Development & International Law 46 (2005).
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islands are roughly located 170 km from the Japanese Ishigaki Island, 370 km from the
mainland China and 180 km from the coast of  Taiwan.2 Each island has its own name
both in Japanese and Chinese as follows: Kuba-shima, Kobi Sho or Huangwei Yu
(Lat: 25° 58’/Long: 123° 41’); Taisho-jima, Akao-sho or Chiwei Yu (Lat: 25° 55’/
Long: 124° 33’); Uotshuri-shima or Diaoyu Dao (Lat: 25° 45’/Long: 123° 29’); Kita
Kojima or Beixiao Dao (Lat: 25° 45’/Long: 123° 33’) and Minami Kojima, Minami-
ko-shima or Nanxiao Dao (Lat: 25° 44’/Long: 123° 34’). Three rocks are also named
in both languages as Okino Kitaiwa or Dabeixiao Dao; Okino Minamiiwa or Dananxiao
Dao and Tobise or Feilai Dao respectively.3
Nevertheless, in Chinese, the whole group of  islands is generally called as Diaoyu
Islands, which originates from the biggest island among them. Taiwan prefers to name
these islands as “Diaoyutai” against “Diaoyu-dao” as called by the mainland China.
Both the terminologies share more or less the same meaning: “Diaoyu-dao” means
“fishing island”; whereas, “Diaoyutai” means “fishing platform”. In 1843, British
explored the islands and named the group as the “Pinnacle Islands”. In 1900, the
Japanese explorer Tsune Kuroiwa renamed the islands as “Sento Shoto” in Japanese
language by following the British translation of  the “Pinnacle Islands”. The word
“Senkaku” and “Sento” share the same meaning in Japanese language. These mean the
“sharp point” or “peak”, as in case of  the English word “Pinnacle” means the “top of
a mountain” or “peak”.4
Dispute concerning the sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between China,
Taiwan and Japan arose mainly due to the existence of  oil deposits underneathand
around. China as well as Taiwan claim historic title over the Diaoyu Islands, as these
have been integral parts of  China since ancient times. Furthermore, it is contended
that islands were seized by Japan in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand,
Japan concedes that it had occupied the Senkaku Islands since 1895 while these islands
were terra nullius and totally uninhibited prior to that time. Besides, China and Taiwan
had never challenged Japanese sovereignty over these islands until 1971, which was
after the United Nations reported to have substantial oil and gas reserves in the area.
2 Alfred Soons and Nico Schrijver, “What does international law say about the China-Japan
dispute over the diaoyu/senkaku islands?” (Briefing paper, The Hague: Institute for Global
Justice, December 3, 2012)
3 Daniel Dzurek, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” available at http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/
resources/docs/senkaku.html (last accessed on April 03, 2013).
4 See Martin Lohmeyer, “The Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands Dispute: Questions of  Sovereignty and
Suggestions for Resolving the Dispute” 15-16 (Master Thesis., the Faculty of  Law, University
of  Canterbury, 2008); See also, Steven Wei Su, “The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect
on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between China and Japan,” 3Chinese Journal International
Law 385 (2004).
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As far as contemporary international adjudication on the matter is concerned, a State
has immense prospect of  having title over the territory if  it can prove the exercise of
State sovereignty and ‘effective control’ (effectivités) over the disputed territory. Although
there are several modes and legal principles governing acquisition of  territory under
international law, in practice, the international territorial dispute arbitration, the
Permanent Court of  International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of  Justice
(ICJ) mainly focused on the element of  ‘effective control’ in deciding territorial and
boundary disputes.5 It can be seen from decisions of  the international courts and
tribunals in the following cases, namely, Island of  Palmas;6 Clipperton Island Arbitration;7
Legal Status of  Eastern Greenland;8 Minquiers and Ecrehos;9 Frontier Dispute Case;10 Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute;11 Land and Maritime Boundary Case;12 Pulau Ligitan and
Palau Sipadan;13 and, Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.14
Accordingly, this paper intends to analyse critically the judicial interpretation and
application of  the principle of  ‘effectivités’ by the international courts and tribunals in
resolving inter-state territorial and boundary disputes. Furthermore, it applies the said
principle to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and finally offers some feasible
solutions to address the dispute among the parties in peaceful manners in accordance
with international law.
II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU
ISLANDS
The islands were first recorded in China since 1221 AD15 although Chinese claims to
the Diaoyu Islands dated back to 1372 AD. During the reign of  Ming Dynasty (1368-
5 See Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory: the Library of  Essay in International Law xix(Routledge, London,
2005).
6 Island of  Palmas Case (Netherlands v. USA)  (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
7 Clipperton Island Arbitrarion (France v. Mexico) (1931) 2 RIAA 1105; (1932) 26 AJIL 390; (1932) 6
ILR.
8 Legal Status of  Eastern Greenland Case (Norway v. Denmark) PCIJ Rep Ser. A/B (1933), No. 53.
9 Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (1953) ICJ Rep. 47.
10 Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali) (1986) ICJ Rep 554.
11 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening) (1992)
ICJ Rep 351.
12 Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002) ICJ
Rep 303.
13 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Palau Sipadan Case (Indonesia v. Malaysia) 2002 ICJ Rep 625.
14 Sovereignty over Pedra Branca / Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore)
General List No. 130,  available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf  (last
accessed on April 03, 2013)
15 Unryu Suganumu, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 42 (Hawaii University Press, Hawaii, 2000).
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1644), the Ryukyu kingdom, of  which territory includes from Amami to the Yaeyama
islands, was tributary to the Chinese Emperor. Such tributary relations with China
continued throughout the Ming and Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).16 The Chinese
Emperors sent approximately twenty-four investiture missions to the Ryukyu kingdom
during 1372-1879.17 In 1874, the last mission was dispatched to the vassal state which
was two years after the Japanese annexation of  the kingdom.
In 1372, the first imperial envoy named Yang Zai was despatched followed by a total
of  ten before the mission of  Chen Kan in 1532. However, all these records were lost
due to a fire in the Fujian archives and thus Chen Khan records to the Ryukyu kingdom
became the oldest ever existed to prove Chinese claims to the Diaoyu Islands.18 In the
records, Chen Kan used the name “Diaoyu Yu” by stating that Kume Hill was under
the reign of  the Ryukyu Kingdom. The boundary of  the Ryukyu Kingdom end at the
Kume Hill and therefore the Diaoyu Islands located within the vicinity of  China.19 In
1403, the Shunfeng Xiangsong Guide Book detailed that the Diaoyu Islands could be
used for refuelling wood and drinking water.
In 1561, Guo Rulin led an investiture mission to the vassal state. It was recorded that
the boundary beyond Kume Hill was under the rule of  Ryukyu Kingdom and the
Diaoyu Islands - including Chiwei Island - were considered to be part of  China.20 In
the 16th Century, Diaoyu Tu and Chi Yu were used as part of  China’s coastal defence
system.21 In 1561, Zheng Ruozheng mentioned in his defence manual that the Diaoyu
Islands were appurtenant to the Fujian garrison.22 In 1576, Xiao Chong recorded on
his mission to the Ryukyu Kingdom that it took days to enter into Chinese territory
after passing the Kume Hill.23 Thus, it is obvious that Xiao Chong regarded the area
after passing the Kume Hill was under Chinese rule.
16 M. Lohmeyer, The Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands Dispute: Questions of  Sovereignty and Suggestions for
Resolving the Dispute, 48 (2008) (Master Thesis, the Faculty of  Law, University of  Canterbury.)
17 Han-yi Shaw, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and An Analysis of  the
Ownership Claims of  the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan” (Occasional Papers/Reprinted Series in
Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 3, 1999): 43.
18 Kiyoshi Inoue, “Japanese Militarism & Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island – A Japanese Historian’s
view,” available at http://www.skycitygallery.com/japan/diaohist.html (last accessed on July 28,
2017)
19 Supra note 16 at 54.
20 Supra note 17.2
21 Id. at 56.
22 Tao Cheng, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law
of  Territorial Acquisition,” VJIL 14 (1974): 256.
23 Supra note 15 at 54.
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In 1606, Xia Ziyang explicitly expressed in his record to the vassal state that the Diaoyu
Islands drew the boundary line between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.24 In 1663,
Zhang Xueli led the first investiture mission to the Ryukyu Kingdom during the Qing
Dynasty. Zhang Xueli’s records did not entail any information about the Diaoyu Islands
as he himself  lost the way to the vassal state.25 In 1683, Wang Chi who executed the
Ryukyu’s request for an investiture mission recorded that in the evening after their
arrival to the Chiwei Island, they celebrated ritual to the sea god by scarifying rice, live
pigs and sheep in which they believe the boundary between China and another country.
Thus, this record appears to recognise the area near Chiwei Island which is one of  the
disputed Islands to be the boundary limit between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.
In 1709, Xu Baoguang also recorded upon return from his mission that Kume Hill
was regarded as the southwest boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.26
In 1719, Xu Baoguang published a map of  the Ryukyu Kingdom depicting all its
thirty-six islands without any of  the Diaoyu islands. In 1755, Zhou Huang recorded
the Diaoyu Islands as practical navigational aids on his mission to the Ryukyu
Kingdom.27
In the 18th Century, most of  the Japanese scholars believed that the Senkaku Islands
belonged to China.28 In 1708, Cheng Shuntse stated in his booklet titled General Guide
Book for Navigation that the Kume Hill is the western boundary of  the Ryukyu
Kingdom.29 Similarly, Hayashi Shifei, a Japanese geographer, expressed that the Ryukyu
Kingdom was composed of  thirty-six islands without including the Diaoyu Islands. In
1785, Lin Tzu Ping, a Japanese cartographer, drew a map of  the Ryukyu Kingdom in
which the Diaoyu Islands were considered as part of  Chinese territory.
In the Japanese context, the Ryukyu Kingdom became its tributary starting from year
1609 following the Japanese subjugation to the vassal state during the waning of  the
power of  Ming Dynasty. Since then, the Ryukyu Kingdom was a tributary state to
both countries, i.e., China and Japan.30 In 1872, the Japanese government completely
occupied the Ryukyu Kingdom under the jurisdiction of  the Foreign Ministry and
forced it to cut off  tributary relationships with the Chinese Emperor. In 1876, the
jurisdiction of  the former Ryukyu independent kingdom was delegated to the Japanese
24 Supra note 16 at 50.
25 Supra note 15 at 71.
26 Id. at 76.
27 Supra note 16 at 56.
28 Ibid.
29 Supra note 22.
30 Supra note 16 at 53-57.
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Home Secretary.31 In 1881, after the mediation held by Ulysses S. Grant, the former
President of  the United States (US), China agreed to the Japanese proposal in which
from the Okinawa Islands to the all northern territories to be Japanese and all the
territories belonging to Miyako-Yaeyama islands to be Chinese. The Diaoyu Islands
were not even the subject matter of  that negotiation and they were considered as
Chinese territory per se.32
In 1884, Koga Tatsushiro, a native of  Fukuoka Prefecture, discovered the Senkaku
Islands for Japan and tried to lease the islands from the government of  Okinawa
prefecture, the Ministry of  Home Affairs, the Ministry of  Agriculture and Commerce.
The application was refused on the ground that it was not clear whether the islands
belonged to the Japanese Empire. Hence, at that time, the title of  the islands was
uncertain for Japan.33 The Governor of  the Okinawa Prefecture requested to annex
the Senkaku Islands as part of  his administration to the central government in 1885,
1890 and 1893 respectively.34 On the other hand, in 1893, the Chinese Empress Dowager
Cixi granted the Diaoyu Islands to Sheng Xuanhuai who was the Chief  Minister of
the Court of  Imperial sacrifices and also a businessman in the pharmaceutical sector
of  that time.35
On 1st August 1894, the Sino-Japanese War broke out and China lost its territory in
Taiwan as well as on the Liaodong peninsula as the Chinese military was defeated by
the Japanese.36 In the same year, the central government reacted to the third submission
and conferred the islands to the Okinawa Prefecture. On 14th January 1895, the Japanese
government eventually instructed the prefecture to erect landmarks on the islands.37
Nonetheless, the Cabinet decision did not mention anything about the Chiwei Island.38
On 17th April 1895, China and Japan signed a peace treaty titled “Treaty of  Shimonoseki”
31 Man-houng Lin, “The Ryukyu and Taiwan in the East Asian Seas: A Longue Durée Perspective,”
available at http://www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2258 (last accessed on April 07, 2013).
32 Supra note 18.
33 Supra note 20 at 30.
34 Toshio Okuhara, “The Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and Problems on the
Surrounding Continental Shelf,” Japan Annual of  International Law 11 (1967): 98.
35 Supra note 20 at 60-62.
36 Ian Nish “An Overview of  Relations between China and Japan, 1895-1945” in Christopher
Howe (ed.) China and Japan: history, trends, and prospects 23 (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1995).
37 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands,” available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html (last
accessed on July 29, 2017); See also Supra note 34
38 Supra note 16.
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in which Taiwan was transferred to Japan together with all islands belonging to it.39
Nevertheless, no precise word mentioned in the said peace treaty pertaining to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.40
In 1896, Koga Tatsushiro ranted the islands (Uotshuri-shima, Kuba-shima, Kita Kojima
and Minami Kojima) for thirty years from the Japanese government. He invested in
the development of  these islands and built houses, wharves, reservoirs, drainage, sanitary
facilities, etc. In 1909, the islands already had a population of  248 people forming 99
families altogether.41 After his death in 1918, his son Zenji Koga bought Uotshuri-
shima with the price of  1.825 Yen, Kuba-shima with 247 Yen, Minami Kojima with 47
Yen and Kita Kojima with 31.5 Yen.42
In 1919, a Chinese vessel carrying thirty-one fishermen and their families suffered
breakdown and the incident compelled them to take refuge on the main Diaoyu Island.
Later, they were rescued by the Japanese from Ishigaki Village.43 On 20th May 1920,
Feng Mian, the Consul of  the Republic of  China (Taiwan) in Nagasaki issued a letter
of  appreciation to the Japanese officials for the rescue efforts.44 These islands were
under private ownership until 1941 marking the last Japanese activity on the islands.
In 1943, the “Cairo Declaration” was issued and it mentioned that Japan shall return
all territories occupied since the beginning of  the World War I to the Republic of
China (Taiwan).45 Nonetheless, the declaration does not specifically spell out anything
about the Diaoyu Islands. In 1945, the three victorious nations in the World War II
convened the Potsdam Conference which declared that:
“The terms of  the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese Sovereignty
shall be limited to the islands of  Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor
islands as we determine”.46
After the Japanese unconditional surrender in the WWII on 2nd September 1945, the
Japanese signed the instrument of  surrender at Tokyo Bay and accepted the provisions
set forth in the declaration issued at Potsdam. In this way, both the Cairo Declaration
39 Choon-Ho Park, “Oil under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy,” 14
Harvard International Law Journal  250 (1973).
40 Supra note 16 at 67.
41 Dai Tan, “The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute: Bridging the Cold Divide,” 5 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 146
(2006).
42 Supra note 15 at 119; Supra n. 16 at 70.
43 Supra note 34 at 100.
44 Supra note 17 at 32-33.
45 National Diet Library, “Cairo Declaration,” 2003 available at www.ndl.go.jp/constitution /e/
etc/c03.html (last accessed on April 03, 2013)
46 Caleb Wan, “Security Flashpoint: International Law and the Islands Dispute in the Far East,”
2The New Zealand Postgraduate Law E-Journal 42 (2005)
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and the Potsdam Declaration became part of  the conditions for the Japanese surrender.
On 29th January 1946, the UN confined Japanese territory in Decree 667 to the five
major islands including the Ryukyu Islands north of  30° degree of  north latitude
which excluded the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from being part of  the Japanese territory.47
During the US occupation from 1945-1951, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers (SCAP) was the sole governing authority over Japan.48 In April 1947, the US
State Department published the book “Atlas and Gazetteer” in which the Senkaku
Islands were described as part of  Yaeyama County in Okinawa prefecture. In the same
year, on the other hand, the SCAP published a map which included the Senkaku Islands
as an integral part of  Taiwan.49 The US included the Senkaku Islands as part of  the
administration of  the Yaeyama Islands under Article 1(d) Ordinance No. 22.50 The
final peace agreement with Japan could not settle until 1951 due to the separate
governments claiming for China, i.e., the People’s Republic of  China (mainland China)
and the Republic of  China (Taiwan).51 In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed
between Japan and 48 allied signatories, in which Japan agreed that: “Japan will concur
in any proposal of  the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship
system with the United States as the sole administering authority... Pending the making
of  such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right
to exercise all and any powers of  administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the
territory and inhabitants of  these islands, including their territorial waters.”52
Accordingly, the islands were placed under the US administrative control and trusteeship.
Although the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not expressly include the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, in 1953, the proclamation of  the SCAP describes the islands as being
controlled by the US53 and the US air-force used two of  the islands for training.54 The
US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces jointly patrolled the waters around
the islands. Furthermore, the US Navy made an annual rental payment of  $11,000 to
Zenji Koga, the Japanese private owner of  the Uotshuri-shima Island, as compensation
for using the island until 1978.55
47 Supra note 16 at 73.
48 Robert E. Ward, “The Legacy of  Occupation,” in Herbert Passin (ed.) The United States and
Japan 31 (Columbia Books, Inc., U.S., 1975).
49 Jean-Marc Blanchard, “The US Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku)
Islands, 1945-1971,” 161 The China Quarterly 103 (2000).
50 Supra note 34 at 100.
51 Supra note 45.
52 The San Francisco Treaty 1951, Article 3; Also see Supra note 16 at 76.
53 Seokwoo Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku
Islands,” 3 Boundary and Territory Briefing 11 (2002).
54 Supra note 34 at 101.
55 Supra note 49.
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III EMERGENCE OF THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE
Before the discovery of  oil reserve underneath, these uninhabited islands have less
economic value except some fishing and feather collecting activities56 with some military
significance as a strategic location in terms of  national security.57 In 1969, geologists
from the Republic of  Korea and the Philippines formed a Committee for Joint
Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) under the
sponsorship of  the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).
The outcome of  the survey conducted by the aforesaid committee revealed that the
continental shelf  between Taiwan and Japan may be one of  the most prolific oil
reservoirs in the world.58 A 200,000 sq km next to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was
predicted to be the vital part of  the oil reservoirs.59 This discovery triggered the dispute
concerning the sovereignty over the islands among three claimants, i.e., China, Taiwan
and Japan.60
Chinese Claims
Chinese claims to the Islands are mainly based on the historic title.61 It asserts undisputed
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands as its historical records of  the ownership of  the
islands dated back to 1372 AD.62 Geographically, the islands situate on the Chinese
continental shelf  and accordingly Chinese fishermen exploited waters surrounding
the islands since time immemorial.63 It has been exercising sovereignty over the islands
until those were annexed by the Japanese together with the island of  Taiwan (Formosa)
under the Treaty of  Shimonoseki. After the WWII, Japan returned all occupied
territories and islands to China except the Diaoyu Islands which the US arbitrarily and
wrongfully annexed under the Nansei Islands in accordance with San Francisco Treaty
in which China was not a party. In 1972, the US transferred its administrative powers
over the islands to Japan. China has consistently been protesting against such transfer
together with the Taiwanese authorities.64
56 Yoshiro Matsui, “International Law Of  Territorial Acquisition And The Dispute Over The
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” 40 The Japanese Annual of  International Law 3 (1997).
57 Helena Legarda Herranz, “Diaoyu or Senkaku? Strained Relations in the East China Sea,”
European Institute for Asian Studies – EIAS 1 (2012).
58 See Supra note 16 at 84; Also see Supra note 17 at 13-15.
59 H. Li Victor, “China and Offshore Oil: The Diaoyu Tai Dispute,” 10 Stanford Journal of  International
Studies 143 (1975).
60 See Supra note 16 at 84; See also, Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful
Role In The Senkaku Islands,” 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 917-918 (2008).
61 Supra note  41 at 142.
62 Supra note 1 at 48.
63 M.E. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations. Congressional
Research Service (2013).
64 Supra note 2 at 4.
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Taiwanese Claims
Taiwanese claims are essentially similar to that of  China. It claims that the Diaoyu
Islands belonged to the island group of  Taiwan historically.65  The islands were annexed
by the Japanese together with the island of  Taiwan (Formosa) under the Treaty of
Shimonoseki.66 After the WWII, according to the Peace Treaty of  1952 between Japan
and Taiwan, all treaties and agreements concluded before December 1941 were regarded
as null and void. The Treaty of  Shimonoseki concluded in 1895 was void and therefore
the Diaoyu Islands were necessary to be transferred to Taiwan same as other occupied
territories.67
Japanese Claims
Japan claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands which had become part of  Okinawa
prefecture since their formal prescription on 14th January 1895. It asserts that the
islands were totally uninhabited and thus were terra nullius at that time of  its occupation
on the basis of  repeated surveys of  these islands between 1885 and 1895. Accordingly,
occupation of  terra nullius was lawful at that point of  time.68 Furthermore, it has been
exercising sovereignty over the Islands since 1895 which was not interrupted and
protected neither by China nor Taiwan until 1971 which was after some reports revealed
oil reservoir in the region.69 Thus, after the WWII, the Senkaku Islands were regarded
as part of  the Nansei Shoto Islands by the US which transferred the administrative
rights to Japan in 1972.70 Since then, it continues to exercise of  its sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands.71
IV THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘EFFECTIVITÉS’
Before discussing further into the interpretation and application of  the principle of
‘effectivités’ in the cases decided by the international territorial dispute arbitration, the
PCIJ and the ICJ, it is worthwhile to discuss a little bit on the modes of  acquisition of
territory under international law.
65 See S.W. Su, The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update. 36(1) Ocean
Development & International Law, 45-61 (2005).
66 Supra note 63.
67 Supra note 41 at 145.
68 Jon Lunn, “The territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” International Affairs and
Defence Section 4 (2012).
69 Supra note 41 at 145.
70 Supra note 2.
71 Supra note 17 at 22-28; See also Yasushi Kudo, “Japan, China Need to Manage and Contain Dispute
over Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands” (paper presented at the Council of  Councils Asia Regional
Conference, October 31, 2012).
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Modes of  Acquisition of  Territory under International Law
In the past, there was, of  course, no unanimous agreement in the international
community pertaining to the modes of  acquisition of  territory. In most part of  the
world, state territory was merely regarded as the private property of  monarch. Therefore,
it is not surprising to see that Grotius and his follower even went on to the application
of  the concept of  acquisition of  private property to the acquisition of  territory by
states.72 Afterward, the concept had alerted gradually and the acquisition of  territory
has been considered as the acquisition of  the supreme sovereign authority over the
territory by a state.73
Traditionally, there were five74 modes of  acquisition of  territory under international
law, i.e., occupation; prescription; subjugation, conquest or annexation; cession; and,
accretion. These were the concepts of  the acquisition of  territory developed during
the time when European powers attempted to expand their territories across the world.
In view of  that, acquisition of  territory by way of  subjugation, conquest or annexation
was considered lawful then.75
In the middle of  20th Century, the principle of  self-determination was introduced by
the UN and, as a result, colonial powers needed to grant independence statehoods to
most of  the states that were under their subjugation. Accordingly, acquisition of  territory
by way of  subjugation, conquest or annexation was outlawed ever since.76
Hence, at present, there are only three essential legal concepts in which a State can
acquire territory, i.e., occupation, prescription and cession. Besides, accretion is also
still a legal mode of  acquisition of  territory derived due to the geographical changes
but not on the basis of  any legal notion. Furthermore, there are a few more legal
principles upon which the territorial acquisition by a State can be derived, namely,
acquiescence, recognition, estoppel, continuity, contiguity, uti possidesti and self-
determination.77
Albeit there are several modes and legal principles of  acquisition of  territory under
international law, in practice, the international territorial dispute arbitration, the PCIJ
72 Supra note 5 at xiii.
73 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1996).
74 See Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of  International Law: With Special Reference
to International Arbitration 107 (Archon Books, 1927).
75 Supra note 5 at xiv-xvi.
76 See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 152 (Routledge Publishers,
London, 1997).
77 Abdul Ghafur Hamid @ Khin Maung Sein, Public International Law: A Practical Approach 101-
123 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2011).
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and the ICJ mainly focused on the element of  ‘effective control’ in adjudicating territorial
and boundary disputes.78 It can be seen from decisions of  the international courts and
tribunals in the following leading cases.
International Territorial Dispute Arbitration
In the early 20th Century, it was necessary for a State to exercise effective sovereign
authority over the territory claiming jurisdiction even under the concept of  occupation
in which state normally could claim jurisdiction over a territory by mere discovery and
intention to act as sovereign.
In 1928, this notion was propounded by Max Huber, the sole arbitrator, in the case of
Island of  Palmas79 by saying that:
“[D]iscovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot, at the present
time suffice to prove sovereignty over the Island of  Palmas… It is
moreover an island permanently inhabited, occupied by a population
sufficiently numerous for it to be impossible that acts of  administration
could be lacking for very long periods… The inability in such a case to
indicate any acts of  public administration makes it difficult to imagine
the actual display of  sovereignty…” 80
In this case, the arbitrator emphasised that discovery alone can only confer inchoate
title over the territory and, thus, there must be subsequent exercise of  effective
sovereignty authority over the territory.
In addition, such exercise of  effective sovereignty authority over the occupied territory
must also be continuous as well as peaceful and must not be challenged by any other
state until the critical date. The arbitrator opined that:
“The Netherlands found their claim to sovereignty on the title of  peaceful
and continuous display of  state authority over the Island…”.81
Therefore, the Netherlands was given territorial sovereignty over the Island of  Palmas
as it was exercising effective sovereign authority over the territory peacefully and
continuously.
Nonetheless, it is not crucial for a State to exercise effective sovereign authority as
intention alone is sufficient to occupy if  the territory is totally uninhibited. In 1931-
1932, it was observed in the arbitral award of  the Clipperton Island Arbitration,82 that:
78 Supra note 5 at xix.
79 Supra note 6.
80 Ibid.
81 Supra note 6.
82 Supra note 7
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“[I]f  a territory, by virtue of  the fact that it was completely uninhibited,
is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance
there, at the absolute and undisputed disposition of  that state, from that
moment the taking of  possession must be considered as accomplished
and the occupation is thereby completed”.83
It can be seen that the requirement for exercising effective sovereign authority over
the territory is much depended on the types of  such territory, i.e., whether it is inhibited
or uninhibited.84
The Permanent Court of  International Justice (PCIJ)
In 1933, in the case of  Legal Status of  Eastern Greenland,85 the PCIJ pointed out that:
“[A] claim to sovereignty …, involves two elements each of  which must
be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some
actual exercise and display of  such authority”.86
Thus, there are two separate requirements to be fulfilled for a State that claims
jurisdiction over territory, i.e., the definite intention to act as sovereign over the occupied
territory and the actual exercise of  the state sovereignty over that territory.
The Court found, in this case, that Denmark was sufficiently exercising effective
sovereign authority over Eastern Greenland and stated that:
“The result of  all the documents connected with the grant of  the [trading,
hunting and mining] concession is to show that…the King of  Denmark
was in position to grant a valid monopoly on the East coast … The
concession granted for the erection of  telegraph lines and the legislation
fixing the limits of  territorial waters in 1905 are also manifestation of
the exercise of  sovereign authority. In view of  the above facts and the
absence of  all claims to sovereignty over Greenland by any other Power,
Denmark must be regarded as having displayed during this period of
1814 to 1915 her authority… to a degree sufficient to confer a valid title
to the sovereignty”.87
It can be observed that the PCIJ applied the principle of  ‘effectivités’ as an essential
criterion in deciding the legal status of  Eastern Greenland.88
83 Ibid.
84 Supra note 77.
85 Supra note 8.
86 Ibid; Ian Brownlie, Principles of  Public International Law 134 (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2003).
87 Supra note 8.
88 Supra note 77 at 115-116.
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The International Court of  Justice (ICJ)
In the case of  Minquiers and Ecrehos,89 the ICJ observed that:
“…[T]he British authorities during the greater part of  the nineteenth
century and in the twentieth century have exercised state functions in
respect of  the group… In such circumstances it must be concluded that
the sovereignty over the Ecrehos belongs to the United Kingdom”.90
The Court regarded that the United Kingdom displayed its actual exercise of  state
sovereignty over the Ecrehos group and therefore it acquired the territorial sovereignty
over those islands.
In Frontier Dispute Case,91 the boundary dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, the
parties’ claims for the jurisdiction of  the disputed territory were based on the treaty
and effective control. In this case, the ICJ acknowledged that the exercise of  ‘effective
control’ by the colonial State can support an existing title to the successor State.92 In
the same vein, in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute,93 the boundary delimitation
dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, the parties made claims based on treaties
and effective control, inter alia. In this case, the ICJ focused solely on the exercise of
‘effective control’ by the former colonial state as evidence of  having sovereignty over
the disputed territory and awarded the islands to whichever party had exercised
postcolonial effective control.94 Again, in Land and Maritime Boundary Case,95 the boundary
dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria for the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad
region, the parties’ claims to the territory were based on treaties, history and effective
control, inter alia. The ICJ, after rejecting Nigerian’s arguments on historical title, held
that it reaffirmed the view in Frontier Dispute Case and awarded the territory to
Cameroon.96
Furthermore, in the case of  Pulau Ligitan and Palau Sipadan,97 the Court observed
that:
89 Supra note 9
90 Ibid.
91 Supra note 10.
92 Ibid.
93 Supra note 11.
94 Ibid.
95 Supra note 12.
96 Ibid; further see, Brian Taylor Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of  Justice,”
53 Duke Law Journal 1779 (2004).
97 Supra note 13.
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“Given the circumstances of  the case, and in particular in view of  the
evidence furnished by the Parties, the Court concludes that Malaysia has
title to Ligitan and Sipadan on the basis of  the effectivites referred to
above”.98
In correspondent to the case of  Minquiers and Ecrehos, the Court gave title to Malaysia
on the basic of  having effective control over Pulau Ligitan and Sipadan. In the same
fashion, the ICJ treated Singapore as a State exercising ‘effective control’ over the
Pulau Batu Puteh and awarded the territorial sovereignty from Malaysia to Singapore
in the case of  Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.99
It is observed from the aforementioned decided cases before the international territorial
dispute arbitration, the PCIJ and the ICJ that the principle of  ‘effectivités’ is an imperative
legal principle in resolving inter-state territorial and boundary disputes. The state that
can prove the actual exercise effective sovereign authority over the territory claiming
jurisdiction has massive potential of  having title to that territory.
V THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘EFFECTIVITÉS’IN
THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE
The Chinese and Taiwanese claims for sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
are similar100 as both based their claims mainly on historical facts.101 It is undeniable
that the islands were terra nullius and totally uninhabited before Chinese discovery. A
number of  records made by Chinese investiture missions to the Ryukyu kingdom
during 1372-1879 showed these islands as part of  Chinese territory.102 Moreover, the
Ryukyu Kingdom had never objected or challenged the fact that the Diaoyu Islands
belonged to China.103 Until 1893, China had clearly expressed its intention to occupy
these islands (animus occupandi) and the actual exercise of  the state sovereignty over the
territory (corpus occupandi) by issuing the Imperial Decree of  the Chinese Empress
Dowager Cixi which granted the Diaoyu Islands to Sheng Xuanhuai.104 This is what
led some researchers to opine that the Diaoyu islands were integral part of  Chinese
territory until 1893.105
98 Ibid.
99 Supra note 14.
100 Larry A. Niksch, “Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and
Obligations,” 3 Congressional Research Service (1996).
101 Supra note 16 at 46.
102 Supra note 17 at 43.
103 Supra note 18.
104 Supra note 41 at 143.
105 See Barbara Demick, “The specks of  land at the center of  Japan-China islands dispute,” LA
Times, (September 24, 2012).
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On the other hand, the Japanese conducted survey throughout 1885-1895 to confirm
the status of  the Senkaku Islands. The Japanese government incorporated the islands
by the cabinet decision on 14th January 1895, which was prior to the “Treaty of
Shimonoseki”.106 Furthermore, none of  these islands was the subject matter of  the
said treaty107 and it was perhaps by mistake that the Chinese assumed that Japan had
annexed the said islands under the general wordings of  such treaty.108 Consequently,
China acquiesced to the exercise of  Japanese sovereignty over the islands and failed to
conduct any form of  protest against it.
Starting from 1896 until 1941, these islands were under Japanese private ownership. In
1909, the islands already had a small population of  248 people.109 In 1919, Japanese
authorities rescued some Chinese fishermen who suffered breakdown and compelled
to take refuge on the main Island.110 In response to this incident, the Consul of  the
Republic of  China in Nagasaki issued a letter of  appreciation on 20th May 1920. This
situation clearly shows the Chinese recognition of  the Japanese sovereignty over the
islands.111
During the US administration period, the Senkaku Islands were regarded as part of
Yaeyama Islands under Article 1(d) Ordinance No. 22.112 Accordingly, the islands were
placed under the US administrative control and trusteeship. In 1953, the proclamation
of  the SCAP describes the islands as being controlled by the US113 and the US air-
force used two of  the islands for training purposes.114 The US Navy and Japanese
Maritime Self-Defence Forces jointly patrolled the waters around the islands.
Furthermore, the US Navy made an annual rental payment of  $11,000 to Zenji Koga,
the Japanese private owner of  the Uotshuri-shima Island, as compensation for using
the island until 1978.115
If  the general interpretation of  the Treaty of  Shimonoseki were to include disputed
islands within its subject matter, then Japanese effective control over the islands, during
106 Supra note 46 at 21-22.
107 See Jing Zhao, “The Japanese Communist Party and the June 4th Incident of  1989,” US-Japan-
China Comparative Policy Research Institute, http://chinajapan.org/articles/12.1/12.1jingzhao25-
32.pdf  (last accessed on 29, July, 2017) ; Also see Peter N. Upton, “International Law and the
Sino-Japanese Controversy over the Territorial Sovereignty of  the Senkaku Islands,” 52 Boston
University Law Review 776 (Fall 1972).
108 Supra note 65 at 54-55; Supra note 17 at 25.
109 Supra note 41 at 146.
110 Supra note 34 at 100.
111 Supra note 17 at 32-33.
112 Supra note 34 at 100.
113 Supra note 53 at 11.
114 Supra note 34 at 101.
115 Supra note 49 ; Supra note 22 at 247.
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1895-1945, would have been immaterial and Japan had to transfer the islands back to
China. However, China continued to acquiesce to the exercise of  US administration
over the islands between the periods of  1945 to 1972116 and failed to conduct any
forms of  protest against it. China was also completely silent when the islands were put
under the US trusteeship instead transferring them back to China during the post-
WWII arrangement of  Japan’s territory.117 Besides, the “ROC Yearbook” issued in
1962, 1963 and 1968, did not count the islands as falling under the sovereignty of
Taiwan.118 Again in 1965, the book titled “The outline of  Local-Self  Government in
Taiwan Province” impliedly stated that the Tiaoyu-Tai Islands were not under the
Chinese jurisdiction.119 Furthermore, in 1961, the two Taiwanese logbooks stated the
Islands as part of  the Senkaku Gunto.120 It, therefore, seems that both China and
Taiwan did not raise the question of  restoring the Islands to their sovereignty up to
this point.121 Almost 30 years of  effective control over the islands exercised by the US
without any challenge from China and Taiwan, somehow, validated Japanese claims to
the Senkaku Islands.122 Although the islands under the US administration from 1945-
1972 could not also be regarded as Japanese control over the islands,123 the US did
recognise Japanese residual sovereignty over the islands.124 Due to such recognition,
the US would not transfer its sovereign powers to any other state other than Japan.125
On 12th August 1968, forty-five Taiwanese workers, who had been dismantling a wrecked
ship on Minami-kojima Island, were deported by the Japanese officials on the pretext
that they did not carry either passports or immigration permits from the Ryukyu
government. The workers later applied for the Japanese permission and continued
their job in the following year. In May 1969, Japanese erected a national marker on the
main island of  Diaoyu to prove its claim to the island. On 17th July 1970, Japan delivered
a diplomatic note to the Chinese government with the intention to claim the sovereignty
116 Yves Tiberghien, “The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute: Analyzing the Chinese Perspective,” 30 Asia
Pacific Foundation 5 (2012).
117 Supra note 17 at 121.
118 Supra note 16 at 81-82.
119 Supra note 15 at 125; Supra note 34 at 103.
120 Supra note 16 at 82.
121 Supra note 65 at 54.
122 Supra note 49.
123 Supra note 46 at 38.
124 Supra note 49.
125 See International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Office of  the Deputy Chief  of  Staff  for Military
Operations, Department of  the Army, “Okinawa Reversion: A Study of  the Administrative
Aspects,” (secret) (April 1, 1969): 1-2, RG 260 (USCAR), Records of  the HCRI, HICOM
Administrative Files 1969-1972, Reversion Agreements to Pre Comm 1971-72, Box 2, National
Archives-College Park. As cited in Supra note 49.
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over the islands.126 In September 1970, Taiwanese private individuals hoisted a flag on
the island and Japanese authorities removed it on the following day.127 Later, the Japanese
foreign ministry announced that Japan has the inherent sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands and thus there is no necessity to negotiate the status of  these Islands with any
State. Following to this announcement, series of  anti-Japanese protest movements
were launched by the Chinese nationals.128 In 1970, another group of  Taiwanese ship-
dismantling workers were found in Kuba-shima and they were ordered to leave the
place by the Japanese officials.129 Again, none of  these official activities exercised by
Japan were challenged either by China or Taiwan.
It can be seen that from 1895 to 1971, there was no objection to Japanese effective
control over the islands and thus Japan has maintained ‘peaceful and continuous exercise
of  sovereignty’ over the islands.130 Starting from September 1970, the Taiwanese
government asserted that Japan has no right to explore on the Chinese continental
shelf  and the reversion of  the islands from the US to Japan would be a unilateral
decision that would never affect her claims.131 In 1971, China challenged Japanese
sovereignty over the islands after discovering that the disputed area is rich in mineral
and oil resources.132 Taiwan first officially claimed sovereignty over the islands in
February 1971 followed by the Chinese official claim for the ownership of  the islands
on 31st December of  the same year.133 Accordingly, in this case, the critical date is
therefore set to be in 1971. If  the concept of  acquiescence under international law
were to be applied to this case, it becomes too late for both China and Taiwan to start
protest in 1971. The timely protest should have started as early as in 1895 or, at least,
during the post-WWII arrangement of  Japan’s territory.134
On 15th May 1972, Japan regained sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands under the
Okinawa Reversion Treaty in which the US relinquished the Ryukyu Islands and the
Daito Islands to Japan by virtue of  Article 3 of  the San Francisco Peace Treaty.135 In
response to this, China contended that Diaoyu and the other islands have been its
territory since ancient times and thus it is absurd that the US transfer part of  Chinese
126 Supra note 17 at 11.
127 Supra note 16 at 85.
128 Supra note 126.
129 Supra note 17 at 34.
130 Supra note 22 at 242; Also see Supra note 16 at 86.
131 Supra note 22 at 243.
132 Supra note 46 at 32; Also see Supra note 49.
133 Supra note 17 at 37.
134 Mroso Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role In The Senkaku Islands,”
29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 917-918 (2008).
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territory to Japan.136 On the other hand, the US declared that it returned administrative
rights over those islands to Japan as it received them from Japan. Nevertheless, it does
not diminish the rights of  other claimants and thus any conflicting claims to the islands
are a matter to be resolved among the parties concerned. The U.S. Foreign Relations
Committee declared that Japan only has administrative rights and not that of  sovereignty
over the islands under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.137 This treaty, therefore, did not
determine the status of  the islands between China and Japan. However, it is important
to note here is that the US recognised Japanese residual sovereignty over the islands
during the administration of  the Okinawa Islands from 1945-1972.138 At that juncture,
although the US left the dispute in limbo between China and Japan, on the other hand,
it awkwardly found itself  obliged to defend the islands under the 1960 US-Japan Security
Treaty in which the US agrees to protect the areas under the Japanese administration.139
In accordance with the Sino-Japanese Communiqué 1972, China and Japan established
diplomatic relations140 and consequently Japan announced that all treaties with Taiwan
were invalid. Since then, both nations did not formally recognise Taiwan as a state
which can claim sovereignty over the islands.141
In 1972, then Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Chinese Prime Minister
Zhou Enlai agreed to shelve the dispute for the future.142 Before the conclusion of  the
Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978 between China and Japan, Chinese anti-treaty
Diet members recommended the Japanese government to determine the status of
these islands in the upcoming treaty. In April 1978, a hundred armed Chinese fishing
boats were dispatched to the islands. However, the Chinese Vice-Premier Keng Piao
shortly declared that the incident was neither intentional nor deliberate.143 The incident
gave some favours to the Japanese claim and since then Japan acquired at least the de-
facto ownership of  the islands.144
136 Beijing Review, “Tiaoyu and other Islands have been Chinese Territory since Ancient Times,”13-14 (January
7, 1972)
137 Supra note 100 at 4-6.
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139 Supra note 63 at 1; Jason Collins, “China and Japan’s claims to sovereignty over the Diaoyu/
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Yet again, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute was left out from the content of  the
Peace and Friendship Treaty which was concluded on 23th August 1978 between China
and Japan. Moreover, on 22nd October 1978, then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
paid an official good-will visit to Japan in which he confirmed the omission of  dispute
concerning the sovereignty over the islands.145 Later on Japanese Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone agreed to postpone the dispute for the future. It can be observed
that China failed to challenge the territorial sovereignty over the islands timely and left
the islands under the control of  Japan uncontested even after launching of  its formal
protests since 1971.
Meanwhile, since 1972, the Japanese private youth organisation called “Japanese
Qingnianshi” established the beacon on the islands. In 1979, they constructed a
helicopter landing-pad on the Islands146 and proclaimed the islands on behalf  of  Japan.147
In 1990, the Japanese Maritime Safety State agency officially regarded the lighthouse
on Senkaku Islands. When some Taiwanese students hoisted a Taiwanese flag, the
Japanese officials immediately removed it from the islands.148
Since 1990s, China has raised the degree of  activities to prove the sovereignty over the
islands with some physical presence in the disputed area against Japanese control over
the islands.149 In 1992, China enacted the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone which expresses the “Diaoyu Islands” as an appurtenance to Taiwan that is
considered as Chinese territory.150 In 1996, it took initiative with Japan to conduct a
joint exploration of  the oil field by accepting the condition that Japan recognises
China’s sovereignty whereas Japan declined the proposal.151 In July, the Japanese Youth
Organisation returned to repair the lighthouse on one of  the islands flying the Japanese
flag and erected two memorials.152 Accordingly, series of  demonstrations took place in
Hong Kong and Taiwan.153 Since then, several civil and political groups from all three
claiming States have been regularly visiting the islands to demonstrate the sovereignty
of  their domestic government.154 Japanese officials used to expel the activists from the
145 M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” in Getting the
Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis et al. (Tokyo: Japan
Center for International Exchange, 2010), 157.
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islands. On the other hand, the Chinese government, instead of  claiming Japanese
violation of  its sovereignty, remained silent over the issue of  expelling activists from
the islands by the Japanese officials.155
In February 2001, China and Japan concluded a mutual agreement in which each party
is required to give prior notification to the other before entering the waters of  an area
around the disputed islands.156 In 2004 seven Chinese activists landed on the islands
and they were later deported back to China by the Japanese officials.157 In 2005, Japan
published marine maps that include the Japanese lighthouse on the islands and later it
was recognised as an official beacon.158 Since 2006, private ships from China and Taiwan
entered into waters surrounding the islands serially claiming these islands as part of  its
exclusive economic zone. In 2006, members of  the Action Committee for Defending
the Senkaku Islands attempted to land over the islands and later the Japanese Coast
Guard prevented them before landing.159  In 2007, disputing countries installed a 24/
7 telephone hotline in the disputed areas.160
Again in 2008, some Taiwanese activists were escorted by Chinese Coast Guard vessels
approached near to the main island with the intention to assert the sovereignty over
the islands.161 In the same year, a Japanese patrol vessel collided with a Taiwanese
fishing boat and detained the captain for three days.162 Later, Japanese officials apologised
for the incident and paid compensation to the owner of  the boat.163 In July 2010, nine
Japanese fishing boats carried out fishing activities near the islands with the intention
to assert Japanese sovereignty over the islands.164 None of  these activities were
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challenged by neither Chinese nor Taiwanese officials. In September, two Japanese
Coast Guard patrol boats ordered a Chinese fishing trawler to leave the area near the
islands. Upon failure to comply with the order, two coast boats collided with the
fishing trawler and arrested the captain.165
In 2011, a fishing boat carrying some activists was blocked by Japanese Coast Guard
vessels and a helicopter while it was navigating within 23 nautical miles of  the islands.
In response to this event, the Taiwanese Coast Guard Agency despatched five patrol
vessels which later returned to Taiwanese territory.166 In July 2012, a Taiwanese
coastguard vessel escorting activists in the area collided with Japan coastguard vessel.
On 15th August 2012, some activists from China managed to swim ashore. 167 On 17th
August 2012, fourteen activists were deported for illegal entry into the Japanese territory
by the Japanese officials.168 In the same month, four private Japanese vessels carrying
Japanese activists travelled to the islands.169 All these activities were challenged by neither
Chinese nor Taiwanese officials, and it was the Japanese officials who denied the groups
the right to land.170 On 11th September 2012, Japanese government purchased Minami-
kojima, Kita-kojima, and Uotshuri-shima islands from Japanese private owner in order
to diffuse territorial tensions in the region.171 In the same month, the most serious
conflicts occurred between the disputants when seventy five Taiwanese fishing vessels
were escorted by ten Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels to the area. Japanese Coast Guard
ships and the Taiwanese Coast Guard ships fought with water cannons by announcing
their respective claims to the islands.172 In the same year, series of  maritime and aerial
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incursions to the disputed areas occurred and the Japanese government made formal
diplomatic protests to China.173
In January 2013, a boat carrying Taiwanese activists was intercepted and prevented
from landing on the islands by Japanese patrols with the use of  water cannons.174 In
February 2013, a Chinese marine surveillance vessel sailed in the contiguous zone next
to Japanese territorial waters surrounding the islands.175 In response to this, the Japan
Coast Guard deployed Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers to bolster
patrols around the disputed Senkaku Islands.176 The situation become more aggressive
compared to previous years because China and Japan started monitoring the area by
sending fighter airplanes which may trigger a war with the region at any time.177 On
30th March 13, Taiwan intents to discard its claims to the Senkaku Islands while
negotiating a fisheries agreement with Japan. President Ma Ying-jeou is eager to secure
fishing rights in waters north of  the Yaeyama Islands, where Japan intends to give
concessions to Taiwan, than in the Senkakus.178
However, on 31st March 2013, a Taiwanese vessel equipped with machine guns and
water cannons was commissioned to patrol around the disputed islands. At the same
time, President Ma Ying-jeou urged parties to jointly develop the rich natural resources
in the area. China simply ignored the offer as it considers Taiwan as part of  its own
territory.179 Chinese public criticised the government for not being forceful enough
against Japan as protests alone were not sufficient enough to prevent the Japanese
exercise of  effective sovereign authority over the islands.180
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It is clear from the above that, historically, China did consider the islands as an integral
part of  its territory but later acquiesced to Japanese effective control over the islands
during 1895-1945 and the US administration over the islands during 1945-1971.181
Even after 1971, protests made by China were not powerful enough to prevent Japan
from exercising effective sovereign authority over the islands. Only after 1900s, both
China and Taiwan have increased their activities to prove the sovereignty over the
islands in the disputed area. On the other hand, Japan has stronger chance of  getting
the title due to its exercise of  effective sovereign authority over the islands if  it is
adjudicated before an international court or a tribunal in accordance with contemporary
international law.
VI  CONCLUSION
In recent years, the tension among China, Taiwan and Japan over activities in and
around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has become more subtle and sensitive.182 It is
likely to continue unless the dispute concerning the sovereignty over the islands resolved
in one way or another. Of  course, any armed confrontation among the disputants is
not desirable as it would entail grave repercussions to the international peace and
security, inter alia.183 Under the auspices of  the UN, members are required to resolve
disputes among them in peaceful manners as prescribe in Article 2 (3) and Article 33
of  the UN Charter.
It should also be noted that Taiwan cannot be treated as a separate State under
contemporary international law and thus it could not make a separate claim from that
of China as it has no locas standi before the ICJ as a member of the UN and the Statute
of  the ICJ.184 Therefore, China and Japan - being the members of  the UN - may seek
for all available peaceful means in order to solve this dispute. The suggested solutions
would be, first, the negotiation between the disputants for the joint exploitation of
natural resources in the areas of  the disputed islands;185 or, second, the judicial settlement
before the ICJ186 or an ad hoc international territorial arbitration.
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